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Research on spatial perspective-taking often focuses on the cognitive processes of
isolated individuals as they adopt or maintain imagined perspectives. Collaborative
studies of spatial perspective-taking typically examine speakers’ linguistic choices,
while overlooking their underlying processes and representations. We review evidence
from two collaborative experiments that examine the contribution of social and
representational cues to spatial perspective choices in both language and the organization
of spatial memory. Across experiments, speakers organized their memory representations
according to the convergence of various cues. When layouts were randomly configured
and did not afford intrinsic cues, speakers encoded their partner’s viewpoint in memory, if
available, but did not use it as an organizing direction. On the other hand, when the layout
afforded an intrinsic structure, speakers organized their spatial memories according to the
person-centered perspective reinforced by the layout’s structure. Similarly, in descriptions,
speakers considered multiple cues whether available a priori or at the interaction. They
used partner-centered expressions more frequently (e.g., “to your right”) when the
partner’s viewpoint was misaligned by a small offset or coincided with the layout’s
structure. Conversely, they used egocentric expressions more frequently when their own
viewpoint coincided with the intrinsic structure or when the partner was misaligned by
a computationally difficult, oblique offset. Based on these findings we advocate for a
framework for flexible perspective-taking: people weigh multiple cues (including social
ones) to make attributions about the relative difficulty of perspective-taking for each
partner, and adapt behavior to minimize their collective effort. This framework is not
specialized for spatial reasoning but instead emerges from the same principles and
memory-depended processes that govern perspective-taking in non-spatial tasks.
Keywords: perspective-taking, spatial memory, intrinsic structure, audience design, common ground, spatial
descriptions
SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE-TAKING IN COLLABORATIVE TASKS
When coordinating in joint activities, people routinely have to
retrieve spatial information frommemory and convey it to others.
They do so in a range of tasks, such as describing places they have
visited, providing driving directions over the phone, or arrang-
ing where to meet. Since in many such socially-embedded tasks
people often occupy a different spatial viewpoint from their con-
versational partner, one important empirical question centers on
how readily they take their partner’s viewpoint into account.
Much of our understanding of people’s ability to adopt or
maintain non-egocentric spatial perspectives stems from studies
using non-interactive tasks (e.g., Carlson-Radvansky and Irwin,
1993; Carlson-Radvansky and Logan, 1997; Mou et al., 2004b).
Studies using interactive tasks, on the other hand, identify factors
that influence the perspective from which people tend to produce
or interpret spatial descriptions (e.g., Schober, 1993; Mainwaring
et al., 2003; Tenbrink et al., 2011). However, such studies typically
don’t examine directly the underlying off-line spatial representa-
tions or on-line processes that support perspective-taking (but see
Shelton and McNamara, 2004; Duran et al., 2011; Galati et al.,
2013).
Thus far, the findings emerging from both interactive and
non-interactive tasks suggest that when people select a spa-
tial perspective—whether to describe spatial information or to
organize spatial information in memory—they consider vari-
ous sources of information, including cognitive, contextual, and
social factors. For instance, such factors have been shown indi-
vidually to constrain how people organize and maintain spatial
information in memory. When learning and remembering a spa-
tial layout, people appear to interpret it in terms of a reference sys-
tem that maintains spatial relations around a preferred direction
(e.g., McNamara, 2003; Mou et al., 2004a), a process analogous
to determining its “top.” This preferred direction is influenced
by egocentric information, such as one’s initially experienced
viewpoint (Shelton and McNamara, 2001), representational or
environmental information, such as the environment’s geometry
(Shelton and McNamara, 2001), the symmetry or intrinsic struc-
ture of the spatial configuration (Mou and McNamara, 2002; Li
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et al., 2011), functional features of landmarks in the configuration
(Taylor and Tversky, 1992), and even social information available
from the visual context, such as their conversational partner’s
viewpoint (Shelton and McNamara, 2004; Galati et al., 2013).
In this article, we present a framework for how people spon-
taneously recruit both social and representational information
in spatial reasoning. Our view is that people consider all avail-
able cues and, upon gauging the relative cognitive demands of
perspective-taking on each partner, weigh these cues accordingly
to select the perspective that would minimize the pair’s joint
effort. This view differs from earlier proposals that have acknowl-
edged the contribution of multiple sources of information in spa-
tial reasoning, but have given precedence to representational cues
(namely, egocentric experience, Shelton and McNamara, 2001,
and the intrinsic structure of the layout, Mou and McNamara,
2002). Our framework emerges from our own work examining
the perspectives people adopt in joint tasks both in their spatial
descriptions and in their underlying representations supporting
those descriptions. This framework allows for predictions for
both linguistic and memory performance and can account for
how people adapt their encoding, description and coordination
strategies as incoming cues become available in range of spatial
tasks.
Since our focus here is on collaborative tasks, we begin by
reviewing in the next section studies demonstrating the contribu-
tion of social cues in spatial perspective-taking. Then, we present
evidence from own experimental work demonstrating that peo-
ple integrate social cues (the availability of partner’s viewpoint)
with representational ones (their misalignment from their part-
ner’s viewpoint or from the configuration’s intrinsic structure)
to determine the perspective from which to organize informa-
tion in memory and subsequently describe this information to
a partner. Since an assumption of our framework is that partners
jointly aim for efficient communication, in a subsequent section,
we address whether people’s perspective choices are in fact effec-
tive, as reflected by the pairs’ efficiency and accuracy in the joint
task. In the final section, we flesh out in more detail the character-
istics of our proposed framework, addressing along the way some
of the predictions it affords for a range of spatial perspective-
taking tasks. We conclude that people weigh multiple cues to
determine the task’s cognitive demands on themselves and their
partners, and as a result select strategies that are generally effective
in facilitating coordination.
SOCIAL CUES INFLUENCE SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
A growing body of evidence suggests that, when adopting a
spatial perspective, people consider different sources of social
information, including attributional and contextual cues about
their conversational partner. Attributional cues about the part-
ner include pre-existing beliefs or attributions made about the
partner based on prior experience, expectations or a stereotype
(e.g., believing that the partner is unfamiliar vs. familiar with the
environment, believing that the partner is a child vs. an adult).
Such cues, if not available in advance, can also be accumulated
during the course of the interaction and may even be used to
update initial beliefs about the partner (e.g., Brennan et al., 2010).
Whereas attributional cues pertain to the partner’s cognitive or
other intrinsic abilities, contextual cues are not intrinsic to the
partner, but are instead visually available in the physical envi-
ronment and concern the partner’s visibility, relative position in
space, misalignment, or other relevant external features.
In line with other researchers (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986;
Schober, 1995; Duran et al., 2011), we propose that, on the basis
of social cues, people make inferences about their conversational
partner’s ability to contribute to the joint task and adapt their
perspective-taking behavior accordingly. This view follows from
the proposal that, when collaborating, people share responsibil-
ity for ensuring mutual understanding and try to minimize their
collective effort. This shared responsibility requires one partner
to invest greater cognitive effort when appraising that the other
partner is likely to find the interaction difficult; such behavioral
adjustments are said to follow the principle of least collaborative
effort (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Clark, 1996). The evidence
we report in the next two subsections, on how individual social
cues influence perspective-taking, are broadly compatible with
this view.
ATTRIBUTIONAL CUES ABOUT THE PARTNER INFLUENCE SPATIAL
PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
As we have mentioned, one source of social information that
shapes perspective-taking arises from the attributions people
make about the partner’s ability to contribute to the joint spatial
task. Such attributions can depend on the status of the partner—
for instance, whether the partner is believed to be real, imaginary,
or simulated. There is evidence that with imaginary partners,
or with partners with whom they cannot interact contingently,
speakers are more likely to invest in adopting the partner’s per-
spective. That is, speakers are more likely to use descriptions
from the partner’s perspective (e.g., “to your right” or “in front
of you”) and less likely to use egocentric ones when describing
spatial layouts to imaginary partners than to real ones (Schober,
1993). Speakers are also less likely to disambiguate the spatial
descriptions they produce when they suspect that their part-
ner is a confederate and does not have real informational needs
(vs. a naïve participant) (Roche et al., 2010). This adaptation in
perspective holds not only for the production of spatial expres-
sions but for their interpretation as well. When listeners believe
that their partner is real (vs. simulated) they are more likely
to interpret ambiguous spatial descriptions egocentrically than
from their partner’s perspective (Duran et al., 2011). Comparable
adaptation is found in non-linguistic communication strategies
as well: in a “tacit communication game” in which participants
could convey their intentions only through graphical means, they
spent more time signaling the location of critical information
to their partner when they believed they were interacting with a
child than with an adult (Newman-Norlund et al., 2009).
Thus, when people believe that their partner cannot coordi-
nate with them contingently or is otherwise less able to, they are
more likely to adopt the partner’s perspective and invest the effort
to convey spatial information to them. And conversely, when peo-
ple believe that their partner is real and able to coordinate with
them contingently, they are more likely to shift the burden of
mutual understanding to the partner, producing or interpreting
spatial descriptions egocentrically.
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Similarly, speakers adapt their spatial descriptions according
to their beliefs about the partner’s familiarity with the environ-
ment pertinent to the task. When speakers describe landmarks
to a partner who is likely to be is unfamiliar with them (e.g.,
Washington Square Park to a non-New Yorker), speakers use
more detailed descriptions and are less likely to refer to the land-
marks by their proper names than when they interact with part-
ners who are natives of the city (Isaacs and Clark, 1987). Speakers
also adapt how they plan and describe routes within environ-
ments. When describing routes to a partner who is presumed to
be unfamiliar with the environment (vs. for themselves), speakers
elaborate their descriptions by usingmore words and details, refer
to more landmarks for orienting, and simplify the routes by nav-
igating along fewer, larger and more prominent streets (Hölscher
et al., 2011).
As this last study suggests, the framing of the task as collabora-
tive or intended for an audience, as opposed to a monologic activ-
ity, can shape spatial descriptions. In a related study, Mainwaring
et al. (2003) demonstrated that speakers were more likely to adopt
their own perspective when describing spatial information for
themselves, thus bearing the cognitive burden exclusively, whereas
they were more likely to adopt their partner’s perspective when
describing spatial information to a misaligned imaginary part-
ner who presumably bore more of the cognitive burden (see also
Schober, 1993).
Moreover, people adapt their perspective-taking behavior not
only on the basis of their beliefs about the partner’s ability to
contribute to the spatial task, but also on the basis of so-called
“second order beliefs” about the partner: the speaker’s beliefs
about what the partner believes about the speaker’s viewpoint
or abilities. For example, when people believe that their partner
doesn’t know their spatial viewpoint (and therefore cannot con-
sider their perspective), they are more likely to interpret spatial
descriptions from the partner’s perspective (Duran et al., 2011).
In addition to social cues that are available a priori (e.g., by
being told in advance that the partner is unfamiliar with the envi-
ronment, or that the partner is a child), people can often discover
such cues by accruing relevant evidence as the interaction unfolds.
For example, based on their partner’s performance and feedback,
people can make attributions about their relative spatial skills and
thus their ability to advance the joint goals of the task. Schober
(2009) demonstrated that perspective adaptation can occur on
the basis of local, incremental cues, using preselected pairs of par-
ticipants that had matched or mismatched spatial abilities. As
expected, high-ability speakers were overall more likely to use
partner-centered descriptions whereas low-ability speakers were
more likely to use egocentric ones. But critically, during the course
of the interaction, as high-ability speakers in mixed pairs formed
attributions about their low-ability partners they increased their
use of partner-centered descriptions, and conversely, low-ability
speakers describing to high-ability partners decreased their use of
partner-centered descriptions. Similarly, incremental visual cues
about progress on the task, such as errors indicating the part-
ner’s misunderstanding, can contribute to updating attributions
about the partner and lead to appropriate adaptation, such as
disambiguating spatial descriptions (Roche et al., 2010). Thus,
along with a priori information, incoming information about the
partner’s ability to contribute to the spatial task can influence
perspective-taking.
CONTEXTUAL CUES RELATING TO THE PARTNER INFLUENCE SPATIAL
PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
In assessing the relative cognitive demands of perspective-taking,
people consider not only attributional cues pertaining to the part-
ner’s knowledge or ability, but also contextual cues concerning
the partner’s spatial relation to themselves and other features
of the environment. Information that is visually available in the
shared environment, what is termed as the partners’ physical co-
presence, is one of the principal heuristics that people assess in
order to establish what they have in common ground and to tai-
lor their behavior accordingly (Clark and Marshall, 1981; Clark
and Brennan, 1991).
The visibility between partners is, most obviously, one factor
that shapes what is physically co-present and thus influences how
people interact in the context of spatial tasks. For example, in a
task where partners reconstructed arrangements of lego blocks,
pairs who could see each other coordinated differently than those
who couldn’t: speakers adapted their descriptions contingently as
their addressees exhibited, poised, pointed at and oriented blocks,
which resulted in more accurate and efficient performance on
the task (Clark and Krych, 2004). Similarly, in a task in which
pairs were trying to align icons on identical maps displayed on
networked computer screens, when the person giving directions
lacked visual evidence about their partner’s iconmovements, they
left the initiative to move to the next trial to their partner and
went through a lengthier process of verbally checking that they
have achieved mutual understanding (Brennan, 2005).
The misalignment between partners is another salient con-
textual cue that shapes people’s attributions about the partner’s
ability to contribute to the task, making it perhaps the factor most
often manipulated in interactive studies of spatial perspective-
taking. There’s evidence that when pairs jointly reconstruct
layouts that are simple or randomly configured, the degree of mis-
alignment between partners influences the perspective of speak-
ers’ descriptions. For instance, speakers are more likely to use
partner-centered descriptions than egocentric ones when describ-
ing layouts to partners who are misaligned rather than aligned
with them (Schober, 1993, 1995). A caveat here is that, in these
and other experiments (e.g., Mainwaring et al., 2003; Duran
et al., 2011), partners were misaligned exclusively by orthogo-
nal offsets (i.e., were at 90◦, 180◦, or 270◦). Because orthogonal
perspectives are aligned with one’s canonical axes, they may be
privileged and thus relatively easily adopted or maintained (see
McNamara, 2003; Avraamides et al., 2013). The facilitation of
the canonical axes may, thus, account for the similarities in par-
ticipants’ description preferences across different offsets. In our
own studies (Galati et al., 2013; Galati and Avraamides, in revi-
sion), which will be subsequently described in detail, we have
addressed this possibility by including oblique offsets between
partners in order to determine when, in fact, perspective-taking
is most computational demanding for speakers.
The misalignment between partners also influences the shape
of their shared space, which can consequently influence spatial
descriptions, even when these descriptions are embedded in a
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narrative. For instance, speakers adapt the directionality of their
gestures that accompany spatial prepositions, such as in and out,
as a function of the shape of the space they share with their con-
versational partners (Özyürek, 2002). When partners are seated
face-to-face in and out are mapped onto a sagittal axis with
respect to the speaker’s body, whereas when the partner is seated
to the side in and out are mapped onto a lateral axis. These find-
ings are taken to suggest that, in interaction, spatial concepts are
encoded with respect to the partners’ shared space (i.e., with in
corresponding to the “inside” of the shared space).
In sum, people consider various aspects of their relation to
their partner within the physical environment, including their
partner’s visibility, their degree of misalignment, and the shape of
their shared space. Upon considering these contextual cues, they
adapt their descriptions or coordination strategies accordingly.
BEYOND THE INFLUENCE OF ISOLATED SOCIAL CUES
So far we have considered evidence that people consider social
cues, either available from the onset of the interaction (e.g.,
through advance instructions or through the physical environ-
ment) or accrued during the course of the interaction (e.g.,
through the partner’s feedback) to make attributions about their
partner’s ability to contribute to the task.
Overall, when people perceive their partner to be limited in
some way, they invest the effort to adopt their partner’s perspec-
tive or to convey information in a more accessible way. This is
the case when they believe that the partner is imaginary (Schober,
1993), a child (Newman-Norlund et al., 2009), or unfamiliar with
the environment (Hölscher et al., 2011), when they believe the
partner does not know (Duran et al., 2011) or does not share their
viewpoint (Schober, 1993, 1995; Mainwaring et al., 2003), when
they discover that the partner has worse spatial abilities than they
do (Schober, 2009), or cannot provide feedback during the inter-
action (Shelton andMcNamara, 2004; Duran et al., 2011). On the
other hand, when people perceive their partner to be less limited,
as for example when they interact with a real (or assumed to be
real) partner or a partner who can contribute contingently to the
interaction, they may not invest as much effort in adopting the
partner’s perspective and instead rely on that partner to request
clarifications, as needed. Together, these studies serve as a com-
pelling demonstration of the principle of least collaborative effort
(Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Clark, 1996) in spatial tasks.
However, few studies have addressed directly how social cues
are considered alongside other sources of information pertinent
to spatial tasks, such as information about the intrinsic struc-
ture of the configuration. Since real-world environments are often
systematically organized, having axes of symmetry or salient land-
marks, when selecting the perspective from which to describe
them, speakers likely consider not only their partner’s viewpoint
but also other representational cues intrinsic to the configura-
tions. Indeed, some of the reviewed studies allude to the possi-
bility that people integrate multiple sources of information, even
if this is not examined directly. For example, in Hölscher et al.’s
study (2011), a social cue (the partner’s assumed familiarity with
the environment) influenced the extent to which representational
cues (landmarks and other salient features of the environment)
were incorporated in route descriptions.
Our research agenda has focused on elucidating precisely how
social cues about the conversational partner interact with other
sources of information during spatial reasoning. This approach
extends the principle of least collaborative effort (Clark and
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Clark, 1996), insofar as it places an empha-
sis on the probabilistic weighing and interaction of social and
other cues when assessing collaborative effort. Moreover, our
approach focuses not only on clarifying how people combine
various sources of information to adapt how to coordinate in
spatial tasks, but also how this behavior is supported by the
cognitive infrastructure—namely, by spatial memory representa-
tions. Relating perspective-taking choices in descriptions to their
underlying spatial representations would further bolster the view
that partner-specific adaptation in dialog is supported by ordi-
nary cognitive processes acting on memory representations (e.g.,
Horton and Gerrig, 2002, 2005; Metzing and Brennan, 2003;
Pickering and Garrod, 2004). Thus, in our work, we examine how
social and representational cues interact to influence, not only
speakers’ spatial descriptions, but also the preferred perspective
around which they organize spatial information in memory (see
the next section).
Others have shared our view that, at least with respect to orga-
nizing andmaintaining spatial information inmemory, a number
of cues are taken into account. For instance, McNamara and his
colleagues have proposed that learning and remembering a spa-
tial layout involves interpreting it in terms of a reference system,
whose selection depends on spatial and non-spatial properties
of the objects, the structure of the surrounding environment,
the observer’s egocentric viewpoint, and even verbal instructions
(Shelton and McNamara, 2001; Mou and McNamara, 2002). But
contrary to these proposals, which ascribe precedence to certain
cues as being dominant, such as egocentric experience (Shelton
and McNamara, 2001) or the intrinsic structure of the layout
(Mou and McNamara, 2002), we consider all available cues to
be probabilistically combined upon being weighted according to
task-specific demands.
In the context of collaboration, task-specific demands arise
from aiming for effective coordination. On the basis of such
demands, our framework affords predictions for how different
cues are weighted and ultimately whose perspective is selected,
whether for organizing spatial information in memory or for
descriptions. Our framework also affords predictions about how
people make use of cues that become available at different time
points of a spatial task, as for example when discovering the
partner’s viewpoint relative to a configuration only after the con-
figuration has been learned. Specifically, our framework assumes
a great deal of flexibility in incorporating incoming cues to select
a spatial perspective (see also Li et al., 2011). For instance, it
predicts that when having to describe from memory a learned
configuration, people won’t simply select the perspective accord-
ing to which their spatial memory is organized, but will also take
into account new perceptually available cues from the interactive
situation.
In the next two sections, we present some of our experimental
work, which demonstrates that partners consider multiple cues to
assess each other’s cognitive demands when encoding and com-
municating spatial information. In the final section of this article,
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we describe in more detail our framework for flexible perspective-
taking, which qualitatively accounts for our experimental results
and affords predictions for other perspective-taking tasks.
WEIGHING SOCIAL AND REPRESENTATIONAL CUES IN
SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
In our work, we have focused on one contextual social cue—the
a priori visual availability of the partner’s misaligned viewpoint.
Our goal was to examine the conditions under which this a priori
social cue influences how speakers spontaneously organize spatial
information in memory and how they describe it to their partner.
In the first study (Galati et al., 2013), we examined whether know-
ing the partner’s viewpoint in advance is, on its own, a sufficient
cue to influence speakers’ memory and descriptions. In the sec-
ond study (Galati and Avraamides, in revision), we examined how
the availability of the partner’s viewpoint may be used in conjunc-
tion with another representational cue, the intrinsic structure of
the spatial layout, to shape memories and descriptions.
In both studies, in order to clarify how memory represen-
tations support perspective-taking behavior, we dissociated the
learning of spatial layouts from their description: speakers first
learned a spatial layout, had their memory of the layout assessed,
and then described it from memory to a partner. Most earlier
studies don’t address the relationship between memory repre-
sentations and linguistic choices, as they involve situations in
which speakers can see the spatial information they describe (e.g.,
Schober, 1993, 1995, 2009; Mainwaring et al., 2003), learn the
spatial information while simultaneously describing it (Shelton
and McNamara, 2004), are instructed to describe spatial infor-
mation from a particular perspective before their memories are
assessed (Shelton and McNamara, 2004), or describe familiar
environments whose underlying memory representation is not
directly assessed (Hölscher et al., 2011). Dissociating the encod-
ing of spatial information of from its description enables us to
determine not only whether advance knowledge of the partner’s
viewpoint influences speakers’ memories and descriptions, but
also the extent to which speakers rely on their memories when
describing spatial information.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE AVAILABILITY OF THE PARTNER’S
MISALIGNED VIEWPOINT
In Galati et al. (2013), we asked whether knowing the part-
ner’s viewpoint in advance influences speakers’ memory and
descriptions. In 18 pairs, one participant (the Director) first stud-
ied a randomly configured tabletop layout of seven objects (see
Figure 1). They later described it from memory to another par-
ticipant (the Matcher), seated at a separate round table, who
reconstructed the layout by following the Director’s descriptions
(see Figure 2). This took place across three blocks that varied
in terms of what Directors knew about their Matcher’s view-
point when studying the layout. In the first block, Directors didn’t
know that they would later describe the layout to a Matcher,
whereas in the subsequent blocks, whose order was counterbal-
anced across pairs, they either knew they would describe the
layout to a Matcher but didn’t know the Matcher’s viewpoint,
or knew the Matcher’s viewpoint because the Matcher was co-
present in the room during learning, seated at the position they
FIGURE 1 | One of the three seven-object layouts used in Galati et al.
(2013),whose configuration was designed to appear seemingly
random. It comprised a battery, a flashlight, a bowl, an orange, a yoyo, a
button, and a vase. The arrows represent the Director’s viewpoint (0◦), and
the Matcher’s viewpoint when offset by 90◦, 135◦, and 180◦.
FIGURE 2 | Set-up of our studies, showing the Director’s and Matcher’s
working stations, and the locations of recording devices. This example
of a description phase illustrates the conditions of Galati et al. (2013) in
which Directors and Matchers were misaligned by 135◦, and the conditions
of Galati and Avraamides (in revision) in which Directors were aligned with
the intrinsic structure (with Matchers misaligned by 135◦).
would occupy at the description phase. The degree of misalign-
ment between partners during the description phase, was 90◦,
135◦, or 180◦, and was counterbalanced across the three blocks.
After studying the spatial layout, the Director’s memory of
it was assessed through two tasks. The first involved judgments
of relative direction (JRDs), which required imagining a specific
location and orientation, and pointing with a joystick to another
object from that imagined perspective (e.g., Imagine being at
the vase, facing the orange. Point to the button.) These JRD tri-
als included eight imagined headings (0◦, 45◦, 90◦, 135◦, 180◦,
225◦, 270◦, 315◦), whose order was randomized. Performance
was assessed in terms of Directors’ orientation latency (the time
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taken to adopt the imagined perspective of the first instruc-
tion) and their response latency (the time taken to point to
the target identified in the second instruction). Performance
on JRDs permits determining the preferred direction partic-
ipants use to organize the spatial relations in memory (e.g.,
Kelly et al., 2007). The rationale is that spatial relations spec-
ified with respect to the preferred direction can be retrieved
from memory more readily than those relations that are not
explicitly specified and therefore have to be inferred. Thus,
judgments from headings aligned with that preferred direction
should show facilitation in terms of the orientation and response
latencies.
We found that, when the Matcher’s viewpoint was unavailable
at study (whether on the first or a subsequent block), Directors
encoded spatial layouts egocentrically: they were faster to imag-
ine orienting to and to respond from perspectives aligned with
their own. On the other hand, when the Matcher’s viewpoint was
known in advance, itwas encoded inmemory, showing distinctive
processing, at least when Matchers were known to be misaligned
by 90◦ or 135◦. When knowing that theMatcher would be at these
offsets, Directors took longer to imagine orienting to headings
aligned with these known viewpoints. This slower orienting may
seem counterintuitive in light of previous findings that speak-
ers can show facilitation for the partner’s viewpoint (Shelton and
McNamara, 2004). However, in our study, Directors knew that
during the description phase they could interact freely with their
Matchers and that their respective viewpoints would be mutually
known (cf. Shelton and McNamara, 2004), such that the Matcher
could bear some of the cognitive burden of perspective-taking.We
therefore proposed that our Directors may have not invested the
cognitive effort at study to organize spatial relations from their
Matcher’s viewpoint, but instead encoded their Matcher’s view-
point to use it later, as needed. The longer orientation latencies
may therefore reflect a reconstructive process, whereby Directors
recalled an episodic representation of their experience at study,
which included the location of the Matcher in space, and linked
the Matcher’s viewpoint to their representation of the layout.
The second memory task provided corroborating evidence
that Directors represented the partner’s viewpoint in memory.
In this task, the Directors drew the spatial layout by indicating
the position of each object on a grid circle representing their
table. These array drawings allowed us to assess the Directors’
memory for the relative positioning of objects and for systematic
biases (e.g., Friedman and Kohler, 2003). We found that when
Directors knew their Matcher’s viewpoint in advance, their draw-
ings showed a reliable rotational bias by approximately 5◦ toward
the Matcher’s viewpoint.
Following these memory tasks, Directors described the layout
from memory to their Matcher. We examined the distribution
of Directors’ egocentric (e.g., “in front of me is the bracelet”)
and partner-centered (e.g., “the battery is to your right”) expres-
sions. The distribution of these types of expressions allows for
inferences concerning whether an egocentric or partner-centered
perspective was predominately in use, and thus reflect Directors’
overall description strategies. We found that Directors did adapt
their spatial expressions according to what they had known about
their Matchers at study (see Table 1). However, knowing the
Table 1 | Means (and standard deviations) of the proportions of
Director-centered and Matcher-centered expressions produced by
Directors describing layouts that were randomly configured (Galati
et al., 2013) or with an intrinsic structure (Galati and Avraamides, in
revision).
Director-centered Matcher-centered
CONFIGURATION IS RANDOM
Matcher’s viewpoint unavailablea
Misaligned by 90◦ 0.16 (0.22) 0.28 (0.17)
Misaligned by 135◦ 0.16 (0.14) 0.23 (0.21)
Misaligned by 180◦ 0.22 (0.23) 0.18 (0.14)
Matcher’s viewpoint available
Misaligned by 90◦ 0.15 (0.20) 0.26 (0.17)
Misaligned by 135◦ 0.42 (0.23) 0.08 (0.13)
Misaligned by 180◦ 0.16 (0.11) 0.24 (0.16)
CONFIGURATION HAS INTRINSIC STRUCTURE
Matcher’s viewpoint unavailable
Aligned with Director 0.34 (0.20) 0.09 (0.16)
Aligned with Matcher 0.00 (0.00) 0.45 (0.05)
Aligned with Neither 0.27 (0.25) 0.10 (0.13)
Matcher’s viewpoint available
Aligned with Director 0.17 (0.09) 0.18 (0.16)
Aligned with Matcher 0.05 (0.07) 0.31 (0.31)
Aligned with Neither 0.00 (0.00) 0.29 (0.20)
For both studies, the distribution of these expressions is shown across the avail-
ability of the Matcher’s viewpoint at learning (unavailable vs. available) and across
the relative positioning of the conversational partners (in Galati et al., 2013, with
respect to their misalignment, whereas in Galati and Avraamides, in revision,
with respect to their alignment with the intrinsic structure.).
aThis combines the two conditions from Galati et al. (2013), in which the
Matcher’s viewpoint was unavailable: the first block in which Directors didn’t
know there would be a description phase and a subsequent block in which they
did know about the description phase but did not know the Matcher’s viewpoint.
Matcher’s viewpoint in advance did not determine on its own
the perspective of Directors’ descriptions. For instance, when
Directors knew their Matcher’s viewpoint at study, they didn’t
simply use more partner-centered expressions during the descrip-
tion. Instead, they made strategic choices upon considering
the demands of perspective-taking on themselves and their
Matchers.
When perspective-taking was relatively easy (at the small
offset of 90◦), Directors used Matcher-centered expressions
more frequently than egocentric ones. When pairs were coun-
teraligned and thus shared a canonical axis, Directors mixed
perspectives more frequently, suggesting that they could alter-
nate flexibly between their own and their partner’s perspective.
When perspective-taking was known to be more computation-
ally demanding for Directors, at the oblique offset of 135◦, they
were more likely to describe layouts egocentrically, as shown in
Table 1. That is, since Directors presumably bore more of the
cognitive burden in this task, having to recall spatial relations
and convey them to their partner, they opted for their own
perspective when perspective-taking was especially demanding
for them, letting their partners unpack the spatial mappings of
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their egocentric descriptions. Explicit agreements between part-
ners to do so did, indeed, happen most often when partners
had known in advance they would be offset by 135◦ relative to
the other offsets. Thus, the availability of the partner’s viewpoint
enabled both interlocutors to mutually recognize when the cogni-
tive demands would be taxing for the person carrying the greatest
cognitive load and to adapt their communication strategies in
ways that facilitated their coordination (for evidence for this
facilitation see the next section, on the Coordination in Spatial
Perspective-Taking).
Thus, speakers do not spontaneously use their partner’s view-
point as an organizing direction for their memories when it
is available; in our study, Directors didn’t show facilitation for
their partner’s viewpoint (cf. Shelton and McNamara, 2004). But
despite not using the partner’s viewpoint as an organizing direc-
tion, speakers do represent that viewpoint in memory; this was
evidenced by the Directors’ array drawings and the distinctive
processing, in JRDs, of perspectives aligned with the partner (at
least when they weremisaligned, though not counteraligned, with
their partner). Finally, when describing this spatial information,
speakers don’t merely rely on their initial representations, but
are able to use information perceptually available in the task
(i.e., their degree of misalignment from their partners) to adapt
descriptions appropriately.
The flexible adaptation of speakers’ perspective choices, here,
is consistent with the principle of least collaborative effort (Clark
and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Clark, 1996) in that partners shared
the burden of ensuring mutual understanding and shifted their
cognitive effort appropriately. When recognizing that one of
them was especially likely to find the perspective-taking difficult
(e.g., the Director describing the layout from a 135◦ offset), the
other readily invested greater effort (e.g., the Matcher agreed to
interpret descriptions from the Director’s viewpoint).
INTEGRATING THE PARTNER’S MISALIGNED VIEWPOINT WITH
REPRESENTATIONAL CUES
So far, we have seen that when speakers are not instructed
to adopt their partner’s viewpoint and can interact freely with
their partners, they may not have sufficient pragmatic moti-
vation to organize spatial relations around a non-egocentric
viewpoint. Organizing spatial relations non-egocentrically pre-
sumably requires investing cognitive effort, at least when there
aren’t any other spatial cues, as with the randomly configured lay-
outs in Galati et al. (2013). In such circumstances, as we’ve seen,
speakers can represent the partner’s viewpoint relative to the spa-
tial layout and use it later as needed. In our next study (Galati and
Avraamides, in revision), we wanted to establish whether speak-
ers would have sufficient pragmatic motivation to organize spatial
relations around the partner’s viewpoint, when that viewpoint is
reinforced by additional spatial cues.
The overall procedure of this study was similar: Directors first
studied a spatial layout, which now had an intrinsic orienta-
tion (seven real objects were configured across a bilateral axis of
symmetry, as shown in Figure 3), while either knowing their mis-
aligned Matcher’s viewpoint or not. Then, as with Galati et al.
(2013), the Directors’ memory of the layout was assessed through
JRDs and array drawings, and finally they described the layout to
FIGURE 3 | The seven-object layout used in Galati and Avraamides (in
revision), whose configuration had an intrinsic structure. It comprised a
flashlight, a yoyo, a bucket, a battery, a candle, a marble, and a vase. The
arrows at 0◦, 135◦, and 225◦ represent the viewpoint that Directors and
Matchers occupied at the different conditions of their relative alignment
with the intrinsic structure.
their Matcher. In this experimental design, across the 24 pairs, the
Director’s and the Matcher’s relation to the intrinsic structure of
the layout differed, such that the structure was aligned with the
Director, the Matcher, or neither partner. A third of the Directors
studied arrays while aligned with the intrinsic structure (from 0◦),
and later described it to a Matcher who was offset by 135◦ (mea-
sured counterclockwise from 0◦). Another third of the Directors
studied arrays from 225◦ and later described it to a Matcher who
was aligned with the structure (at 0◦). And a final third of the
Directors studied arrays again from 225◦ and later described to
a Matcher who was offset by 135◦, such that neither partner was
aligned with the structure. For each group, half the Directors had
known at study their Matcher’s subsequent viewpoint and half of
them did not. By dissociating the study from the description of
the spatial layout and varying systematically the convergence of
cues (i.e., whose viewpoint was aligned with the structure), we
aimed to clarify how people integrate these cues as they become
available.
The memory tests revealed that the preferred direction around
which Directors organized spatial relations in memory depended
on the convergence of cues—i.e., on whose viewpoint was rein-
forced by the layout’s intrinsic orientation. This was most obvious
by how Directors oriented their array drawings. When Directors
had studied layouts while aligned with their intrinsic structure,
they always drew them from their own viewpoint; it did not
matter whether they knew their Matcher’s subsequent viewpoint
or not. When they had studied layouts while misaligned with
the intrinsic structure, knowing the Matcher’s subsequent view-
point did influence how they oriented their drawings. Specifically,
they were more likely to use the structure’s axes (vs. their own
viewpoint) as the organizing direction when knowing in advance
that the Matcher would be aligned with the structure. And con-
versely, they were more likely to use their own viewpoint (vs. the
structure’s axes) when not knowing their Matcher’s subsequent
viewpoint. When knowing in advance that the Matcher would
also bemisaligned with the structure, Directors were equally likely
to draw arrays from their own viewpoint or from an axis of the
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structure, perhaps because the intrinsic structure became more
salient (relative to not knowing the Matcher’s viewpoint) upon
considering objects from a second oblique viewpoint.
Performance in the JRD task corroborated that Directors had
indeed organized spatial relations in memory according to the
orientation of their drawings. Directors who had drawn layouts
aligned with the structure were faster to orient to and respond
from headings aligned with the structure’s axes (0◦, 90◦, 180◦,
270◦), whereas Directors who had drawn layouts misaligned with
the structure (specifically from their study viewpoint of 225◦),
where faster to orient to and respond to from headings aligned
with that viewpoint and its canonical axes (i.e., 315◦, 45◦, 135◦).
Directors also selected perspectives strategically in their
descriptions. In this study, we examined the distribution of
three types of spatial expressions of theoretical interest: Director-
centered, Matcher-centered, and Structure-centered ones. The
latter category involved expressions that were from headings
aligned with the intrinsic structure and were not person-centered
(e.g., “On the perpendicular. You’re supposed to be on one side on
the left, and I’m on the one side of the table on the right.”). Overall,
as shown in Table 1, Directors used reliably more Matcher-
centered expressions than other types of expressions when the
Matcher was aligned with the structure, and used numerically but
not reliably more Director-centered expressions than Matcher-
centered ones when they were the ones aligned with the structure.
As with Galati et al. (2013), speakers didn’t merely rely on the
organization of their memories to choose the perspective of their
descriptions, but rather took into account information that was
perceptually available during the description phase. Although
Directors used overall more Matcher-centered expressions when
knowing their Matcher’s viewpoint in advance, the preferred
direction of Directors’ memory (as reflected by their drawings)
did not reliably influence their distribution of egocentric or
partner-centered expressions. For example, even though most
Directors who had studied layouts from 225◦ while not knowing
their Matcher’s viewpoint organized spatial information egocen-
trically in memory, they used overwhelmingly Matcher-centered
expressions when they interacted with aMatcher who was aligned
with the structure (at 0◦) (see Table 1). In other words, when the
convergence of available cues at the interaction strongly biases a
particular perspective (e.g., when the partner’s viewpoint and the
structure’s intrinsic alignment coincide), speakers override their
initial memory representation to select the perspective of their
descriptions.
Nevertheless, the advance availability of a social cue, such
as the partner’s viewpoint, and its relation to other cues (e.g.,
the intrinsic structure) can influence perspective-taking, when
it highlights alternative and potentially useful perspectives for
encoding and describing a spatial layout. As we have men-
tioned, Directors who studied layouts from 225◦ were relatively
more likely to use the structure’s axis as an organizing direc-
tion when knowing that the Matcher would be at 135◦ compared
to not knowing the Matcher’s viewpoint. Knowing in advance
that neither partner was aligned with the structure influenced
descriptions as well: when Directors at 225◦ had known in
advance thatMatchers would be at 135◦, they usedmoreMatcher-
centered than egocentric expressions, and used numerically more
Structure-centered expressions compared to not knowing the
Matcher’s viewpoint. Thus, knowing the partner’s viewpoint
while studying a layout from an oblique viewpoint can make its
intrinsic organization more apparent and can influence both how
speakers organize spatial information in memory and how they
describe it.
Together, the findings of these two studies set the stage for a
framework for how people use multiple cues, including social and
representational ones, in spatial perspective-taking. Upon consid-
ering all available cues jointly and weighing them according to
their salience and relevance to the task, people select the perspec-
tive reinforced probabilistically by most cues, and organize spatial
information in memory or describe it to a partner accordingly.
One assumption here is that people consider the perspective rein-
forced bymultiple cues to be optimally effective inminimizing the
pair’s collective effort. In the next section, we examine whether in
fact the perspectives pairs select make their coordination more
effective.
COORDINATION IN SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
We have so far suggested that collaborating partners select
the perspective reinforced by all available cues in an effort to
minimize their collective effort and maximize their efficiency
of coordination—their efficiency at behaving contingently to
achieve shared goal. To determine whether, in fact, people are
adept at gauging which perspective would be most effective in
the task, we examined two aspects of collaborative performance
in our previously described studies.
The first, which tapped into pairs’ efficiency on the task, was
the number of conversational turns—uninterrupted stretches of
speech by a Director or a Matcher—that pairs took to reconstruct
a spatial layout. We took conversational turns to reflect the pairs’
degree of grounding, or exchanging evidence about what they
do or do not understand (e.g., Clark and Brennan, 1991; Clark,
1996; Brennan, 2005). Examining the pairs’ turn-taking patterns
enables us to identify the circumstances and description strategies
that contribute to facilitated grounding: when perspective-taking
strategies facilitate grounding, pairs should interact over fewer
conversational turns.
The second collaborative outcome tapped into pairs’ accu-
racy on the task: it assessed the accuracy with which Matchers,
having followed the Directors’ descriptions, reconstructed the
spatial layouts with real objects on top of their table. Using
bidimensional regression analyses we compared the Matcher’s
reconstruction (photographed from a bird’s eye view at the
end of the session) to the veridical coordinates of the original
configuration. Again, when the pairs’ perspective-taking strate-
gies are effective, the Matchers’ reconstructions should be less
distorted.
It is important to note that what conversational partners con-
sider to be an effective strategy is task-dependent, rather than
strictly defined in terms of efficiency and accuracy. In our studies,
the pairs’ goal was to reconstruct layouts as accurately as pos-
sible despite lacking visual access to each other’s work stations.
These task-specific goals and constraints must have influenced
the criterion that pairs adopted to reach the mutual belief that
they had understood each other well enough for their current
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purposes. According to Clark and Brennan (1991), this “ground-
ing criterion” depends both on the goals of communication
(here, emphasizing accuracy) and the affordances of the com-
municative situation (here, lacking visibility). Thus, although
an effective strategy is ideally one that maximizes efficiency in
terms of turn-taking while also yielding high accuracy on the
resulting reconstruction, in some circumstances, efficiency and
accuracy may be dissociated if weighted differently by the task’s
goals.
SOCIAL AND REPRESENTATIONAL CUES SHAPE GROUNDING
For the pairs who reconstructed randomly configured layouts
(Galati et al., 2013), knowing the partner’s viewpoint at learn-
ing helped their subsequent efficiency in some circumstances.
Specifically, pairs took numerically fewer turns to complete the
reconstruction of the layout when they had mutually known
in advance that they would be misaligned by the oblique 135◦
than by the other, orthogonal offsets (see Galati and Avraamides,
2012). This counterintuitive pattern makes sense insofar as the
Directors’ description strategies were suitable. As we’ve reported
in the previous section, in Galati et al. (2013), at the oblique
and more computationally demanding offset of 135◦, Directors
showed a strong preference for describing layouts from their
own perspective, frequently upon their Matcher’s prompting.
This strategy turned out to be beneficial in alleviating their col-
lective effort, as reflected by their conversational turns. In fact,
as Directors used greater proportions of egocentric expressions
when knowing their Matcher’s viewpoint in advance, pairs took
reliably fewer turns to reconstruct the layout.
In this article, we present some analyses not reported else-
where, on the efficiency of pairs who reconstructed layouts
that had an intrinsic structure (from the corpus of Galati and
Avraamides, in revision). In these circumstances, the number
of turns that pairs took to complete the task was determined
primarily by the alignment of the two partners’ viewpoints rel-
ative to the intrinsic structure at the description, F(2, 18) = 4.44,
p < 0.05. Here, advance knowledge of the partner’s viewpoint
did not influence significantly the number of turns pairs took
to reconstruct the layout (p = 0.99) and did not interact with
the partners’ alignment with the structure (p = 0.98). Partners
were the least efficient when neither of them was aligned with
the intrinsic structure during the description: in that scenario
they took an average of 259.25 turns (SD = 125.29), whereas
they took an average of 114.88 turns (SD = 66.87) when the
Matcher was aligned with the intrinsic structure and 166.75
turns (SD = 68.27) when the Director was aligned with it.
Indeed, compared to when neither partner was aligned with the
structure, pairs took significantly fewer turns when the Matcher
was aligned with it, 95% CI (−247.49, −41.26), p < 0.01, and
marginally more so when the Director was, 95% CI (−195.62,
10.62), p = 0.08.
Together, the patterns of turn-taking in the two experiments
underscore the flexibility with which people use all available cues
to select a spatial perspective in a joint task. When the spatial
layout does not afford any representational cues (as when it is
randomly configured), the a priori availability of a social cue,
such as the partner’s subsequent viewpoint, can enable partners
to recognize when coordinating a perspective would be difficult
for the partner bearing greater responsibility for mutual under-
standing and to agree on a perspective that alleviates that partner’s
cognitive demands. With turns as a proxy of partners’ collab-
orative effort, these mutually agreed-upon strategies can make
their interactions more efficient. On the other hand, when the
spatial layout affords an intrinsic organization, its alignment rel-
ative to each partner during the interaction is what influences
most the efficiency of coordination. In general, interactions are
more efficient when the orientation of structure of the layout con-
verges with one of the partner’s viewpoints than when it does
not. Even though pairs were misaligned by a smaller offset when
neither of them was aligned with the structure (by 90◦) com-
pared to when one of them was aligned with the structure (in
which case their offset was 135◦), the process of coordination was
lengthier: thus, it was their relation to the intrinsic structure, not
their misalignment from each other, that influenced their effi-
ciency. We will return to this point in the final section of our
article.
Thus far, we have seen that pairs generally adopt strategies
that make their coordination more efficient in terms of the num-
ber of conversational turns they take to complete their joint
task. When the layout provides intrinsic cues that coincide with
a given partner’s perspective, speakers describe the layout from
that person-centered perspective and this strategy is effective.
When the layout does not provide such intrinsic cues, a priori
information about the partners’ relative viewpoints helps deter-
mine which perspective is optimal for the speaker—adopting that
perspective is an effective strategy.
SOCIAL AND REPRESENTATIONAL CUES SHAPE THE PAIRS’
ACCURACY ON THE TASK
Although the availability and convergence of various cues facili-
tated performance in terms of the efficiency of dialogs as reflected
by turn-taking, it didn’t facilitate performance in the same way in
terms of accuracy on the task. We assessed accuracy by examining
the bidimensional regression coefficient (BDr), which estimates
the goodness-of-fit between the tabletop reconstructions and the
actual coordinates of the arrays, thus capturing unsystematic
error in reconstructions when systematic biases are accounted for.
We also examined the rotation parameter (θ), which indicates the
degree to which the tabletop reconstruction was rotated relative
to the studied array, thus capturing a potential systematic bias in
the reconstructions.
In our study with randomly configured layouts, the only
reliable finding from examining the Matcher’s tabletop recon-
structions was that the relationships among objects became
more distorted as Directors used more Matcher-centered expres-
sions (see Galati and Avraamides, 2013). This could be due
to Directors inadvertently introducing more inaccuracies in
descriptions when computing spatial relations and selecting spa-
tial terms from a non-egocentric perspective. This possibility
is supported by the fact that, when partners were offset by
180◦ and Directors could more easily map egocentric spatial
terms to partner-centered ones (e.g., my left = your right), the
reconstructed layouts were less distorted than at the offsets of
90◦ and 135◦.
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In our study with layouts with an intrinsic structure, our
new analyses reported here reveal a somewhat different pattern.
Although the BDr was not reliably correlated with any of the three
main types of expressions (Director-centered, Matcher-centered,
Structure-centered), pairs reconstructed were less distorted lay-
outs as Directors used greater proportions of Matcher-centered
expressions with Matcher’s aligned with the layout’s intrinsic
structure (Pearson’s r = 0.83, p < 0.05). As we have shown in
Galati and Avraamides (in revision), in this alignment condition
Directors adopted the strategy of describing layouts from their
Matcher’s viewpoint, using overwhelmingly Matcher-centered
expressions. This strategy was therefore effective, not only in
terms of reducing the number of turns (see previous subsec-
tion), but also in terms of yielding less distorted reconstructions,
underscoring that there was no speed-accuracy tradeoff in pair’s
efficiency. In general, reconstructions did not become more dis-
torted as pairs interacted over fewer turns (Pearson’s r = −14,
p = 0.52), suggesting that pairs upheld the goal of the task to
reconstruct layouts that were as accurate as possible.
Nevertheless, pairs demonstrated a systematic bias in rotating
the spatial layout when its intrinsic structure was aligned with
the Matcher during the description. For reconstructions in that
condition, the average rotation parameter was θ = 1.94, r = 0.24.
Individual θ’s were not uniformly distributed around 0◦ (V =
1.88, p = 0.17). On the other hand, for reconstructions in the
aligned-with-Director condition, the average rotation parameter
was θ = 9.93, r = 0.97, 95% CI [−3.22, 23.08], and individ-
ual scores were uniformly distributed around 0◦, V = 6.66, p <
0.001). This was also the case for reconstructions in the aligned-
with-Neither condition, θ = −8.07, r = 0.94, 95% CI [−24.23,
8.09], V = 7.47, p < 0.001.
To summarize, although collaborating partners are successful
at selecting perspectives that increase their efficiency, by min-
imizing their collective effort in terms of the length of their
interaction, these perspectives don’t always make them accu-
rate on the task. In particular, decrements in accuracy seem to
arise when speakers describe spatial information from the part-
ner’s viewpoint, especially when the configuration does not afford
an intrinsic structure. When the configuration does afford an
intrinsic structure, adopting the partner’s perspective when it is
reasonable to do so (when the partner is aligned with the struc-
ture) may be effective in some ways (e.g., reducing the length of
the interaction, reducing distortion in the reconstructions) but
not others (e.g., eliminating systematic rotational biases).
A FRAMEWORK FOR FLEXIBLE PERSPECTIVE-TAKING IN
SPATIAL TASKS
Our findings contribute to a framework for flexible perspective-
taking that captures several of the nuanced ways in which speak-
ers reason and coordinate in spatial tasks. In our framework,
perspective-taking is flexible insofar as speakers consider all avail-
able cues—both social and representational—and weigh them
according to their salience and relevance to the task to select the
most effective perspective. This probabilistic weighing of cues dis-
tinguishes our framework from others that ascribe precedence to
egocentric experience (Shelton and McNamara, 2001) or intrin-
sic structure (Mou and McNamara, 2002). Another consequence
of this simultaneous weighing of multiple cues is that a sin-
gle cue, such as the partner’s viewpoint, may require further
reinforcement from other cues to be adopted as an organizing
direction in spatial memory. Pragmatic motivation from explicit
instructions (Shelton and McNamara, 2004) or from the intrinsic
structure (Galati and Avraamides, in revision) can supply such
reinforcement. It also suggests that the misalignment between
partners does not on its own reflect the computational demands
of perspective-taking; instead, as we will argue, misalignment can
lead to appropriate attributions about each partner’s cognitive
demands only in conjunction with other cues. Our framework’s
proposal that people use multiple, weighted cues extends to non-
social spatial perspective-taking as well, affording predictions for
which perspective or organizing direction they will select, even
when reasoning for themselves.
That interacting partners take into account take each other’s
relative cognitive demands when selecting a perspective further
underscores the flexibility of perspective-taking. Through this
process, they determine the most effective perspective to use both
for organizing information in memory and for describing it to
one another. As we will discuss, in determining their relative
cognitive demands, people take into account the collective effort
invested across all phases of their joint task, from learning to the
interaction.
In our framework, perspective-taking is also flexible in the
sense that speakers don’t rely blindly on their memories when
selecting the perspective of their descriptions. Instead, they use
perceptual information from the communicative information
(e.g., about their partner’s viewpoint), even if this hadn’t been
available in advance. In other words, they use both a priori and
incrementally unfolding cues to update their attributions about
which perspective would be optimal. Their assessment for what
constitutes an effective perspective that would minimize their
collective effort and maximize their performance depends on
the grounding criterion they adopt in light of task’s goals and
constraints.
Finally, perspective-taking is flexible insofar as reflects the
general flexibility of the cognitive system. Our framework con-
siders partner-specific adaptation to emerge from ordinary cog-
nitive processes acting on ordinary memory representations,
whether spatial or episodic ones. As such, the principles of our
framework—that speakers consider a confluence of cues, whether
available perceptually or a priori, aiming to minimize collec-
tive effort—hold not just for spatial perspective-taking, but for
conversational perspective-taking more broadly.
Below we expound further on the main characteristics of this
framework and the insights that follow from it.
PEOPLE CONSIDER SIMULTANEOUSLY SOCIAL AND
REPRESENTATIONAL CUES
During the course of perspective-taking, people consider various
sources of information, including social cues (e.g., the availabil-
ity of the partner’s viewpoint), representational spatial cues (e.g.,
the layout’s intrinsic structure), and egocentric biases (e.g., based
one’s own learning viewpoint). When multiple cues are avail-
able, people consider their confluence, weighing them according
to their salience and relevance to the task.
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In weighingmultiple cues, people in collaborative tasks have to
appraise the relative cognitive demands on each partner in order
to select the perspective that minimizes their collective effort. An
assumption here is that the perspective that is reinforced by the
greatest number of cues or by the most salient cues is the most
effective and thus preferable for encoding spatial information in
memory and in language. Indeed, as we have shown, converg-
ing social and representational cues (e.g., the alignment of the
layout with a given partner’s viewpoint) motivate the use of a
given perspective as the preferred orientation in memory and in
descriptions.
Critically, a social cue, such as the availability of the partner’s
viewpoint, may not be sufficient on its own to shape the orga-
nizing direction of spatial memories (Galati et al., 2013) since
organizing spatial relations around that viewpoint is costly and
is unnecessary when pairs can interact freely and can correct mis-
understandings (cf., Shelton and McNamara, 2004). As we have
shown, in free dialogs, the partner’s viewpoint may simply be
encoded in memory. However, when this social cue converges
with other cues (e.g., the layout’s intrinsic structure), it can be
used as the preferred direction of spatial representations at no
discernible cost, despite being non-egocentric.
The intrinsic orientation of a spatial configuration is there-
fore one factor that contributes to adopting a non-egocentric
viewpoint around which to organize spatial relations in mem-
ory. Related findings have led other researchers to propose that
the intrinsic orientation of a layout is the dominant factor deter-
mining the preferred direction around which to organize infor-
mation in memory (Mou and McNamara, 2002). However, in
our framework, rather than ascribing precedence to particular
cues, all available cues are weighted probabilistically according to
task-specific demands. (Indeed, in Galati and Avraamides, in revi-
sion, Directors didn’t invariably organize information in memory
according to the configuration’s intrinsic structure.) When mul-
tiple cues that are relevant to the task reinforce a particular
viewpoint, that viewpoint is more likely to be adopted. Thus,
when the orientation of the structure converges with one’s own
viewpoint, people opt for that egocentric viewpoint, whereas
when it converges with their partner’s viewpoint, they opt for
their partner’s viewpoint.
A final observation is that social cues can be combined not only
with other types of non-social information (e.g., representational
cues), but also with other types of social cues. A contextual cue
concerning the partner (e.g., his misalignment from the speaker)
can interact with an attributional cue about the partner (e.g.,
concerning his spatial abilities). For example, when a speaker
describes a spatial layout to a partner misaligned by a relatively
difficult offset (e.g., the oblique 135◦), she may use more partner-
centered expressions if she perceives him to have relatively poor
spatial abilities, but more egocentric ones if she perceives him to
have relatively good spatial abilities. Such predictions following
from our framework can be explored in future research.
PEOPLE CONSIDER THE COGNITIVE DEMANDS OF
PERSPECTIVE-TAKING FOR BOTH PARTNERS
Our framework accommodates and is compatible with the prin-
ciple of least collaborative effort (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986;
Clark, 1996)—the view that, in sharing responsibility for mutual
understanding, conversational partners adapt their behavior in
ways that aim to minimize their collective effort and facilitate
their coordination.
In collaborative spatial tasks, the relative cognitive demands
of perspective-taking on each partner motivate the perspec-
tive from which people encode or describe spatial informa-
tion. Critically, the partner’s viewpoint can influence the pro-
cess of estimating their respective perspective-taking demands,
as soon as it becomes available—whether at encoding or at the
interaction.
In several real-world scenarios, people first have to commit
certain spatial information to memory and convey it to someone
else later, as for example, on a road trip when the co-pilot studies
the route to the destination on a map and then gives directions
from memory to the driver. In such situations, our framework
posits that, to gauge their and their partner’s relative cognitive
demands, speakers must consider the cognitive effort they would
invest in total, both when encoding the information and when
describing it. Speakers must therefore estimate whether invest-
ing additional cognitive effort at encoding would yield savings in
the effort they would expend later, when coordinating with their
partner.
Having information about the upcoming interaction available
in advance enables speakers to better anticipate the perspective
most effective during the interaction and to adapt their encod-
ing strategies accordingly. In our work, when speakers knew in
advance that their partner’s viewpoint was aligned with the lay-
out’s intrinsic orientation, they were more likely to adopt it as
an organizing direction at encoding. Organizing spatial relations
according to the partner’s viewpoint made sense in terms of min-
imizing subsequent effort: speakers judged that this would be
an effective perspective from which to describe the layout since
the partner would not have to unpack the mappings of spatial
expressions. Indeed, when the partner was aligned with the struc-
ture, speakers used overwhelmingly partner-centered expressions
and pairs were the most efficient, at least in terms of their
conversational turns.
Nonetheless, the availability of the partner’s viewpoint alone,
without the reinforcement of intrinsic spatial cues is not suffi-
cient motivation, in free dialogs, to invest in organizing spatial
relations around their partner’s viewpoint. As we have seen,
when speakers studied randomly configured layouts, they sim-
ply represented that viewpoint in memory in order to use
it later, as needed. Despite not having invested the effort to
encode such layouts from their partner’s viewpoint, speakers
could still adapt their descriptions upon considering the rel-
ative cost of perspective-taking based on their misalignment
(see the subsection on the right column for a more detailed
discussion of the factors contributing to the cost of perspective-
taking). For instance, speakers could still adopt their partner’s
viewpoint in descriptions when perspective-taking was relatively
easy for them (e.g., at small or canonical offsets). And when
perspective-taking was relatively difficult (e.g., at oblique off-
sets), speakers would opt for their own perspective in descrip-
tions. Their partner’s endorsement of this strategy indicates that
pairs mutually agree to reduce the cognitive demands of the
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speaker, who in this context was encumbered by the greatest
effort due to having to retrieve and describe spatial relations from
memory.
People’s dynamic and sophisticated adaptation of perspective
choices suggests that they seek perspectives that are optimally
effective in minimizing their effort, not just when collaborating,
but also when investing cognitive resources in preparation for that
collaboration. This is a novel elaboration of the principle of least
collaborative effort.
PEOPLE USE FLEXIBLY A PRIORI AND PERCEPTUALLY AVAILABLE
INFORMATION
The above discussion, regarding the cognitive demands at encod-
ing and at the interaction, underscores the dissociation between
the perspective of spatial descriptions and of the spatial memo-
ries supporting those descriptions. Our work demonstrates that
speakers don’t merely rely on the organization of their mem-
ories to select how to describe spatial relations, but instead
also use information that is perceptually available in the inter-
action. A contextual social cue, such as the partner’s view-
point, can shape descriptions even it had been unavailable
at encoding and thus not incorporated in speakers’ memory
representations.
For example, in Galati et al. (2013), when the partner’s view-
point wasn’t available at study speakers didn’t necessarily use
more egocentric expressions at the description, and conversely,
when the partner’s viewpoint was available at study speak-
ers didn’t necessarily use more partner-centered descriptions.
Instead, speakers’ description strategies were guided by contextual
cues they encountered at the interaction: seeing that the partner
was misaligned by a relatively small offset led to more frequent
use partner-centered descriptions, whereas seeing that the part-
ner was misaligned by an oblique offset led to more frequent use
of egocentric expressions.
Similarly, in Galati and Avraamides (in revision), the contex-
tual social cue of the partner’s viewpoint shaped descriptions
even when its relation to the layout’s structure was unknown at
encoding. Overall, the organization of speakers’ memories (as
reflected by the orientation of their array drawings) didn’t reliably
influence their descriptions. For instance, despite most frequently
encoding a spatial layout egocentrically when having studied it
from a viewpoint oblique to its structure (225◦) without knowing
the partner’s viewpoint, speakers overwhelmingly used partner-
centered expressions upon encountering a partner aligned with
the structure at the description.
Together, these findings suggest that speakers carefully attend
to contextual social cues—partner-specific information that is
perceptually available in the social situation—and use this infor-
mation readily. As a result, they may override their perspec-
tive preferences for encoding the spatial information. This view
is compatible with findings that people don’t always adhere
to the organizing direction of their memories when it con-
flicts with perceptual evidence, but use instead both sources of
information to select the perspective of their descriptions (Li
et al., 2011). Thus, the organization of spatial memories does
not dictate how spatial information is subsequently described.
Descriptions are also guided by perceptual information, which
partners use to determine the optimal perspective for the collab-
orative task.
PEOPLE DON’T ASSESS THE RELATIVE DIFFICULTY OF
PERSPECTIVE-TAKING ONLY BASED ON THEIR MISALIGNMENT
There have been some incongruent findings concerning the off-
sets at which spatial perspective-taking is most difficult in col-
laborative tasks. In a study that involved interpreting another’s
spatial descriptions, listeners incurred a greater processing cost
as the degree of misalignment from their partner increased
(Duran et al., 2011). On the other hand, some studies focus-
ing on production reported similarities in speakers’ descriptions
across misaligned offsets: with misaligned partners, speakers
used partner-centered expressions with comparable frequency,
regardless of the degree of misalignment (Schober, 1993, 1995;
Mainwaring et al., 2003). This was taken as evidence against a
mental rotation model of perspective-taking, and in favor of a
categorical distinction between reasoning from an egocentric vs.
a non-egocentric perspective (Schober, 1995). However, in all
of these studies, real or assumed partners were misaligned by
orthogonal offsets (90◦, 180◦, 270◦). This methodological feature
may limit our understanding of when perspective-taking is most
demanding since, according to McNamara (2003), perspectives
aligned with canonical axes can be facilitated relative to oblique
ones.
Our findings are line with McNamara (2003) view, since when
no intrinsic cues were available speakers opted for egocentricism
when they were misaligned by 135◦ from their partners: they
were more likely to use egocentric expressions at 135◦ than at
90◦, but no more likely (and, in fact, marginally less likely) to
do so at the maximum offset 180◦. These findings suggests that
this oblique viewpoint is more computationally demanding, at
least when producing spatial descriptions (though we find con-
verging evidence from the interpretation of spatial descriptions
in ongoing work in our lab).
Our findings offer a further caveat: it is notmisalignment alone
that ultimately determines the difficulty of perspective-taking, but
its combination with other cues. In our study with layouts with
an intrinsic structure, speakers made different description choices
depending on the alignment of the structure with either partner,
despite the partners’ misalignment remaining the same. Directors
who were at 0◦ with Matchers at 135◦ overall opted for their own
perspective in descriptions, presumably because reasoning from
a perspective oblique to the structure (and their own) was com-
putationally more difficult. However, Directors who were at 225◦
with Matchers at 0◦ (also a 135◦ offset) readily opted for their
partner’s perspective.
In sum, people do not simply mentally rotate a spatial con-
figuration in order to consider their partner’s viewpoint. It is
not the case that as the misalignment between partners increases
perspective-taking becomes more difficult. Adopting the part-
ner’s viewpoint when the partner is misaligned by an oblique
offset is generally more difficult than canonical offsets, though
not when it is reinforced by other representational cues. The mis-
alignment between partners determines the relative difficulty of
perspective-taking for each partner in conjunction with other
cues.
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PEOPLE SELECT PERSPECTIVES THAT LEAD TO MORE EFFICIENT BUT
NOT ALWAYS MORE ACCURATE PERFORMANCE
As we have noted, the adaptation we documented in our studies is
consistent with a principle governing human interaction, whereby
conversational partners seek to minimize their collective effort
and maximize the efficiency of their coordination (Clark and
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Clark, 1996). Overall, attributions about the
partner’s ability to contribute to mutual understanding, enabled
by either a priori or perceptual information, lead to strategies that
improve task performance. In our studies, recognizing which per-
spective would be optimal for a particular set of circumstances
led to description strategies that were successful at reducing col-
lective effort. Despite the high grounding criterion that pairs
had to adopt, given that instructions emphasized accuracy and
that speakers could not visually monitor their partner’s progress
in reconstructing the layout, speakers still managed to select
strategies that made interactions efficient.
For instance, pairs took fewer turns to reconstruct randomly
configured layouts when they knew in advance that they would
be misaligned by an oblique and presumably computationally
demanding offset, compared to other orthogonal offsets (Galati
and Avraamides, 2012). Under those circumstances, pairs rec-
ognized that adopting the perspective of the speaker would be
beneficial and were more likely to explicitly agree on that per-
spective in advance. Thus, when the spatial layout does not afford
intrinsic cues, a priori information about the partners’ cogni-
tive demands (derived from their relative viewpoints) helps pairs
select strategies that make the interaction efficient.
When the layout does afford intrinsic cues, considering the
relation of those spatial cues to social cues was critical to deter-
mining the optimal perspective. As we’ve found, interactions
took longer in terms of turn-taking when intrinsic cues were not
aligned with either partner compared to when they were. And
when intrinsic cues converged with the perspective of the partner
(vs. the speaker), interactions were somewhat more efficient. This
is likely because it was easier for partners to interpret partner-
centered expressions (which speakers used almost exclusively
when the structure was aligned with the partner) than speaker-
centered expressions (which speakers used at greater proportions
when they were the ones aligned with the structure).
Nevertheless, although partners made reasonable assumptions
about which perspective would be optimal to adopt and although
these perspectives minimized their collective effort in terms of
their conversational turns, they didn’t necessarily improve all
aspects of performance on the task. In terms of accuracy, we’ve
found that when the partner was aligned with the layout’s struc-
ture, reconstructions exhibited a significant rotational bias rela-
tive to the other alignment conditions, despite being significantly
less distorted the more partner-centered expressions were used.
Thus, adopting the partner’s perspective in this scenario was an
effective strategy in most but not all outcomes.
Adopting the partner’s perspective when layouts did not afford
an intrinsic structure was actually detrimental to accuracy: recon-
structions were more distorted as speakers used more partner-
centered expressions. This distortion was curbed somewhat when
partners were counteraligned, perhaps because the straightfor-
ward mappings of egocentric to other-centered expressions (e.g.,
my left = your right) made it easier for speakers to provide
more accurate descriptions, or for partners to interpret speakers’
descriptions in the intended way.
Altogether, even though in our studies accuracy was prioritized
in pairs’ joint goal, it wasn’t always achieved perfectly. Whether
the source of inaccuracies resides in the speakers’ descriptions
or the addressees’ interpretations remains unresolved. Future
research could clarify this by examining task performance against
the qualitative content and structure of the pairs’ dialogs, beyond
just the proportions of speakers’ spatial expressions (e.g., high-
level description strategies, such separating the table in quad-
rants). Another methodological consideration for future studies
would be to include measures of spatial ability for both collab-
orating partners. Accounting for some of the variability arising
from individual differences in spatial ability can help distinguish
whether decrements in accuracy are due to speakers’ poor recall
and inadequate descriptions or due to partners’ misinterpretation
of otherwise accurate descriptions. Such efforts would inform
the dynamic coupling of partners behaving contingently in joint
spatial tasks.
PERSPECTIVE-TAKING BEYOND SPATIAL TASKS
Our framework for spatial perspective-taking reflects the gen-
eral flexibility of the cognitive system; it is not intended as
a framework specialized for or limited to spatial perspective-
taking. Our view is that coordination in spatial perspective-
taking is governed by some of the same principles as non-spatial
perspective-taking—when people consider their conversational
partner’s conceptual construal, their knowledge, or agenda (see
Schober, 1998).
To determine the similarity of their conceptual perspectives,
people routinely have to consider what they have in common
ground with their conversational partner and to tailor how to
produce or interpret utterances. Discrepancies in perspective are
especially apparent when there are asymmetries in the partners’
respective knowledge or ability, as when one interacts with a
non-native speaker (Bortfeld and Brennan, 1997) or a novice
(Isaacs and Clark, 1987). Indeed, when people share the same
perspective (whether conceptual or physical), it can be triv-
ially easy to adopt the partner’s perspective; people can perform
generic linguistic or behavioral adjustments (benefiting them-
selves), rather than adjustments that are specifically designed for
their partner (Brown and Dell, 1987; Dell and Brown, 1991).
Investigations of partner-specific adaptation should therefore dis-
sociate the perspectives of speakers and their partners (see Keysar,
1997).
Our empirical undertaking to unveil the relation between lin-
guistic perspective choices and the underlying spatial memories
that support them is compatible with a memory-based view of
partner-specific adaptation. This view considers linguistic and
behavioral adjustments to the partner to emerge from cognitive
constraints acting onmemory-dependent processes (Metzing and
Brennan, 2003; Pickering and Garrod, 2004; Horton and Gerrig,
2005). Specifically, shared experiences with a partner and partner-
specific associations are considered to be represented in memory
and accessed through ordinary processes, such as resonance with
combinations of cues in working memory, influencing behavior
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accordingly (Horton and Gerrig, 2005). In this view, failures in
perspective-taking occur when relevant information about the
partner isn’t available early enough (Kraljic and Brennan, 2005),
when complex inferences about the partner have not yet been
made (Gerrig et al., 2000), when executive functioning is taxed
(Brown-Schmidt, 2009), or under time pressure (Epley et al.,
2004).
Our own findings underscore that simple but relevant cues
about the partner (e.g., the partner’s location in space, their
relation to a configuration’s intrinsic structure) can indeed be
represented and used to compute the relative difficulty of reason-
ing from their perspective, consequently determining linguistic
choices. This is also in agreement with proposals that when
information about the partner is readily available, can be rep-
resented simply or computed unambiguously, it can influence
language processing at no discernible cost, relative to egocentric
processing (Brennan and Hanna, 2009; Galati and Brennan, 2010,
2013).
Our framework is also in line with constraint-based models
of language processing (e.g., MacDonald, 1994; Tanenhaus and
Trueswell, 1995; McRae et al., 1998). According to constraint-
based models, information from various sources, including the
discourse context, within-sentence structural, lexical biases, and
even information about the partner (e.g., Hanna et al., 2003;
Brown-Schmidt and Hanna, 2011), is integrated probabilistically
and in parallel to shape the interpretation of utterances, and pre-
sumably also speech plans. Similarly, in computational models of
perspective-taking, attributions about the partner can be repre-
sented as control parameters that can alter behavior (e.g., Duran
and Dale, 2013). Other computational accounts also underscore
that language processing is adaptive by demonstrating that lan-
guage users update probability distributions of relevant discourse
features (e.g., syntactic structures) as new linguistic evidence
becomes available (Fine et al., 2010).
In our work, we’ve demonstrated that in spatial tasks people
indeed use all relevant information from various sources, whether
it becomes available at encoding or at collaboration, to form attri-
butions about each partner’s relative cognitive effort, which they
can update during the course of the interaction and tailor their
behavior. This relevant information can include contextual social
cues, such as the partner’s location in space, or attributional cues,
such as beliefs or expectations about the partner’s spatial abil-
ities. Such social cues may combine with other cues—intrinsic
or functional properties of the objects, the intrinsic structure
of the layout or the surrounding environment, one’s egocentric
viewpoint, and explicit instructions—to determine perspective
choices in a constraint-based fashion.
Such an approach departs from proposals that have, on the
one hand, acknowledged that the organization of spatial mem-
ories depends on the contribution of several cues, but on the
other hand, held that certain cues are dominant (Shelton and
McNamara, 2001; Mou and McNamara, 2002). Neither egocen-
tric experience (Shelton and McNamara, 2001) nor the intrinsic
structure of a spatial configuration (Mou and McNamara, 2002)
necessarily need to carry the greatest weight across all tasks.
Instead they interact with other weighted parameters, including
attributional and contextual cues about the partner.
Finally, our framework for the flexible processing of multiple
cues can be extended to non-interactive spatial perspective-taking
tasks. We propose that even in non-social situations where peo-
ple have to imagine adopting different perspectives in space (as
when imagining how our redecorated living room would look
from different vantage points), the preference for or ease of adopt-
ing particular perspectives depends on the confluence of weighted
relevant cues.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have emphasized the centrality of social cues
in spatial perspective-taking and have outlined a framework for
flexible adaptation of memory and behavior in collaborative spa-
tial tasks. Studying spatial perspective-taking by focusing entirely
on individual processes overlooks the ubiquitous and remark-
able ability with which people coordinate with one another in
a range of everyday activities. The findings emerging from our
experimental work underscore people’s ability to appraise both
social and other representational cues to select the perspective
that would be optimal forminimizing their collective effort. Thus,
information about the partner (whether derived from the visual
context, or from inferences or prior expectations), alongside other
cues, can shape how spatial relations are organized in mem-
ory and whose perspective is adopted in descriptions. We have
argued that this adaptation involves weighing cues according to
their relevance and salience to the task, similar to constraint-
based approaches, and selecting the perspective most reinforced
by the summated contribution of those cues. Moreover, cues
are factored into this process whenever they become available—
whether through perceptual evidence or advance knowledge. This
highlights the flexibility with which people convey information
accessed from spatial memory: rather thanmerely relying on their
memory’s organization, their assessment of task-specific demands
is updated by incoming cues.
Partner-specific adaptation in spatial tasks emerges from pro-
cesses comparable to those governing non-spatial perspective-
taking. This holds both for the principles that regulate the social
dynamics of interacting partners (e.g., the principle of least
collaborative effort), and for the general cognitive architecture
that supports adopting spatial and conceptual perspectives other
than one’s own. When executive functioning is overloaded, or
when relevant cues aren’t readily available or easily computed,
the ability to appraise the optimal perspective for the joint task is
compromised. Partners in perspective-taking tasks—spatial and
non-spatial—consider multiple sources of information to make
attributions about their respective ability to contribute to mutual
understanding. According to these attributions, they adapt how
they represent partner-specific information in memory and how
they coordinate in dialog.
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